There has been a recent identification of a need for a New Business History. This discussion connects with the analytic narrative approach. By following this approach, the study of business history provides important implications for the conduct and institutional design of contemporary industrial policy. The approach also allows us to solve historical puzzles. The failure of the De Lorean Motor Company Limited is one specific puzzle. Journalistic accounts that focus on John De Lorean's alleged personality defects as an explanation for this failure miss the crucial institutional component. Moreover, distortions in the rewards associated with industrial policy, and the fact that the objectives of the institutions implementing the policy were not solely efficiency-based, led to increased opportunities for rent-seeking. Political economy solves the specific puzzle; by considering institutional dimensions, we can also solve the more general puzzle of why activist industrial policy was relatively unsuccessful in Northern Ireland.
Introduction
There is a need for the creation of a 'new business history' as de Jong, Higgins and van Driel have identified. 4 This paper provides an illustration of one path that such a project could take. The focus on methodology in the paper by de Jong, Higgins and van Driel reflects the wider trend that has occurred within business history during the last decade. 5 The turn has included calls for a discussion on the methodological directions that any 'new business history' should follow. 6 The continued focus on single firms within business history, as noted by de Jong, Higgins and van Driel, is not the source of the methodological problems faced by business historians. Studying single firms may actually highlight the need for more general (analytic) models. The use of such models, as de Jong, Higgins and van Driel observe, will in turn enable business historians to connect particular business systems, entrepreneurs or firms to more general insights.
Moreover, as argued here, such general insights may have implications related to contemporary policy needs as well as historical puzzle solving. This ability to solve historical puzzles, as well as greater policy focus, may help renew business history. 7 As some eminent scholars have recently observed, economists are increasingly aware that economic historians can offer policy lessons from history and debunk myths. 8 These authors suggest that a greater policy focus will promote the fortunes of economic history. Business historians should follow suit in the trend towards more general policy relevance.
The methodological position criticised in this paper is the (usually implicit) Whiggish assumption that business historians have tended to make by studying only successful organizations. N.S.B. Gras, for instance, argued that dishonest actors would eventually be outcompeted in the world of business. 9 Consequently, there is a danger in simple biological analogies (or Whiggish historical interpretation) that corporate survivors are superior in some robust way and that failed firms are of trivial historical importance. 10 Note also that the Whiggish assumption does not offer much in the way of policy lessons.
Contemporary commentators are more sceptical of the Whiggish approach. These commentators suggest that simplistic evolutionary arguments are excessively optimistic.
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The "analytic narrative" developed later reinforces the contemporary perspective on business history and uses Public Choice arguments to reject the Whiggish interpretation. Hume's observation that institutions needs to be designed to control knavish behaviour, illustrated in the quote at the start of this paper, anticipates Public Choice. James Buchanan and Gordon
Tullock were the pioneers of the Virginia approach to Public Choice. This perspective was defined by James Buchanan as 'the analysis of political decision-making with the tools and methods of economics'. 12 Buchanan argued that Public Choice offered a theory of governmental failure precisely analogous to the theory of market failure provided by theoretical welfare economics. 13 Moreover, Public Choice scholars interpret institutional factors as a cornerstone in historical and economic understanding. 14 A Whiggish approach to business history ignores the fact that, depending on the institutional environment, entrepreneurship can be destructive or unproductive rather than productive. Firms may be able to engage in rent-seeking rather than profit-seeking as a way of remaining in business. 15 As Buchanan observed, firm profit-seeking adds value for society and is thus productive, but rent seeking does not. 16 Rent-seeking behaviour may keep a firm in business by altering the institutional environment in its favour (thereby ensuring it will survive by enjoying positive private returns); however, such an outcome will be socially wasteful. Therefore, at any point of time, firm survival (if it is based on rent-seeking) will not provide a socially optimal form of natural selection. For the purposes of understanding the De
Lorean debacle, as well as considering the more general puzzle of the overall failure of industrial policy in the Northern Irish context, it is particularly important to note the empirical observation made by economists that the industrial policies pursued during the Troubles failed to translate into efficiency improvements. 17 This understandable focus on efficiency, however, downplays the political economy dimensions that helps resolve the general puzzle as well as more specific puzzle of DMCL's failure. Policymakers after the outbreak of unrest had to balance efficiency objectives in industrial policy (such as closing the productivity gap or promoting greater competition) with the need for security and political stability. The desire to promote any economic benefits associated with creative destruction was thus often offset by the need to pursue conflicting objectives.
In terms of structure, we first identify the specific historical problem or puzzle at hand -namely explaining the failure of The De Lorean Motor Company Limited (DMCL). There was no shortage of cash or entrepreneurship. Indeed, it is notable that an entrepreneur, with apparently such a glittering career, as well as a government so willing to devote resources to the project would end up with such a costly failure. Identifying inadequacies in the factors of production cannot resolve the specific puzzle. Despite a state of the art factory equipped with the best machinery, and an enthusiastic workforce desperate to prove themselves, the business was in receivership only a year after production started. Solving this (apparent) puzzle will lead us to the institutional 'analytics' -in this case the Virginia Public Choice tradition, and the rent-seeking subfield within that larger literature. This political-economic analysis is then linked to theoretical models of competition and industrial policy and how such a theoretical approach relates to the historical discussion by Crafts on the role of competition and rent-seeking in the economic performance of Britain and Northern Ireland.
Rent-seeking, which had been suppressed during the 1960s by institutional reform, remerged as a problem against the institutional backdrop of political instability and counter-terrorism.
Such an analytical and more policy-focused approach enables the business historian moreover to go beyond the insights that a purely archival-driven approach, as traditionally practiced by business historians. In the later 'narrative' sections of the paper, the analytic narrative will be developed by presenting historical evidence that demonstrates that solving the puzzle concerning the failure of DMCL is more explicable by invoking rent-seeking than pop psychology. Institutional factors misdirected entrepreneurship; it was possible for opportunistic entrepreneurs to mould institutions in their favour. DMCL was the most extreme example of a more general problem.
Using economics to identify and solve the puzzle(s)
Analytic narratives are a subset of a wider "economic" approach to business or economic history -one that is arguably more compatible with business history than standard cliometrics, which is itself a branch of empirical economics. Economists standard approach is to formulate a puzzle or puzzles. As already observed, the specific puzzle in this case is explaining the failure of DMCL, which was 19 The Northern Ireland Audit Office has calculated the terms total cost to the taxpayer at £77 million between 1978 and 1982. 20 Recently released files put the total cost figures, which include the compensation for damages associated with civil disturbances at the location, at between £83.9 million and £84.3 million.
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McKinsey was commissioned by the Northern Ireland Industrial Development Agency (NIDA) to provide advice on the operation of the firm and it provided monthly progress reports. The fees of these and other consultants do not appear in the official figures.
Nor do the opportunity costs to the taxpayer figure appear. Industry insiders observed that even if only £60 million (at 1978 prices) was the total cost of the venture to the taxpayer this still ensured that the cost per job was (at £30,000) three times the usual cut-off point for industrial promotion expenditure. 22 Yet even these figures, because they ignore the resources devoted to engage in and prevent rent-seeking, underestimate the total social waste. The excessively generous subsidy package offered to attract the project to Northern Ireland points to existence of the additional rent-seeking costs.
Institutions and analytic narratives in economic and business history
The analytic narrative approach may take the form of a detailed country study informed by growth economics and the institutional or political economy literatures. 23 It is possible to classify modern social science along the lines of "thick" or "thin" theory and "dirty" or "clean" empirical work. "Thick" description, as exemplified by much anthropology, highlights the ideographic (particularizing) aspects of a study. In contrast, "thin" or nomothetic (generalizing) theory dominates economics. Likewise, economists favour "clean" empirical work -such as quantitative work in the form of regression; social scientists outside of economics, particularly historians or sociologists, tend to employ "dirty" empirical techniques such as archival study, interviews and ethnography. Analytic narratives attempt to resolve historical puzzles by reconciling the benefits of "thin" description with the advantages of "dirty" empirics. Boettke, in the matrix illustrated in Table 1 , has attempted to provide a simple classification of analytic narratives in relation to three other approaches to historical social science.
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[Insert Table 1 here]
It is possible to reduce the methodological guidelines for conducting a study based on analytic narratives down to the following four characteristics:
Firstly, research within analytic narratives is a puzzle (or problem) -driven not theory-led endeavour. 27 The historical phenomenon that forms the basis of such a study can be investigated by conducting research based on reading primary sources and/or secondary sources. The need for researchers to be intimate with detail suggests that qualitative materials are required. 28 The immersion in the sources will enable the rational strategic interaction between historical actors to be isolated 29 ;
Secondly, the strategic interaction amongst the actors having been identified, the relationship between actors can be studied more formally. Some writers highlight the role of institutions as self-enforcing equilibriums that coordinate behaviour. Often, but not always, such a formalization involves the use of game theoretic analysis. 30 It is essential nevertheless, that the rational choice model chosen -game theoretic or not -bears some similarity to the actual choices and tradeoffs that actual actors faced in the historical phenomenon in question;
Thirdly, the completed model now requires a narrative or "thick description" to be introduced. The purpose of such a narrative is to provide an explanation of the meaning actors attach to their actions, circumstances and surroundings, that is their significance within the local culture 31 ;
Fourthly, once a rational choice framework is chosen, the historical analyst can compare the model's predictions along with the outcomes that can be identified from the historical record. When the rational choice model fails to predict (or at best can only suggest a multiple equilibrium outcome) the narrative will need to be engaged to explain, which other factors isolated from the model, account for the outcome. 32 Influential papers by North and Weingast (1989) and Greif (1994) are examples of research that exemplifies the analytic narratives perspective. 33 Recent examples of such studies in economic history journals that cover institutions, multiple equilibria and rentseeking include papers by Drelichman, Koyama, and Rubin. 34 The approach until recently has made little impact on the writing of business history; however, but this situation is beginning to change. 
Analytics: from institutions to entrepreneurship
Probably the most influential discussion of the connections between institutional environments and entrepreneurship derives from Baumol's seminal paper. 36 Discussing the volume of and intensity of entrepreneurship in his article, Baumol commentated that institutional structures are a determinant of the distinct form of entrepreneurship a particular society faces. Baumol's suggested that some institutional environments and arrangements, with their associated sets of payoffs, have historically been more compatible with productivity-increasing technological innovations than others. 37 He noted that entrepreneurship has historically not always been of the productive variety. Institutions tend to determine both the level and type of entrepreneurship and he identified three types:
productive, unproductive and destructive. Institutional pathologies may ensure that pay-offs are skewed towards rewarding redistribution favouring sectional interests rather than in return for productive entrepreneurship. 38 In extreme cases of dysfunctional institutional payoffs, the relative rewards for rent-seeking may be so high that entrepreneurs will lead a parasitical existence that will damage wider economic performance. talented people choose to seek returns. 40 The paper thus is concerned with how incentives in a society promote rent-seeking or profit seeking. Table 2 illustrates the factors that promote rent-seeking rather more socially useful forms of economic behaviour. Murphy et al present a model as well as empirical material that demonstrates the causes and impacts of rent-seeking.
The analysis indicates that lawyers are damaging for growth, and engineers are good.
According to these authors, the distortions from rent-seeking are threefold: it absorbs labour, it makes the least able entrepreneurs choose to become workers and it turns the ablest people, who are crucial for growth promotion, into rent seekers.
[ Table 2 Here]
Acemoglu develops further the analysis of Baumol and Murphy et al. 41 Of most relevance to later sections of the paper, Acemoglu finds that the reward structures that determine the allocation of talent are endogenous. Furthermore, a multiplicity of equilibria and path dependency may occur: initial differences in rewards and/or allocations (for example due to region-specific factors) will have long-run effects as allocations of one generation shape rewards for the next. Acemoglu concludes that his model implies that reward structure determines the allocation of talent, but he acknowledges that a reverse chain of causation may exist in some historical episodes. 42 Following Baumol's distinction between productive and unproductive entrepreneurship, Nunn develops a model that exhibits multiple equilibria, in order to provide a partial explanation of African economic underdevelopment. 43 Nunn's analysis includes some secondary historical literature survey. As with Acemoglu's paper, the combination of the model and history indicates that initial differences (such as disease incidence) can be a profound influence on institutional-economic outcomes. 44 Henrekson and Sanandaji's contribution is to accept that Buchanan's insights transform Baumol's unidirectional framework into one with a feedback loop. 45 They observe that just as institutions can channel entrepreneurial supply into productive, unproductive or destructive behaviour, so entrepreneurs can (by choosing to abide, evade or alter institutions) determine institutional creation and evolution. 46 Evasive entrepreneurship aims at circumventing the institutional framework, while some entrepreneurs may use political activity to alter institutions. 47 An outline of these definitions is outlined below in Table 3 .
[Insert Table 3 here]
The observed allocation of entrepreneurship in the real world, according to Henrekson and Sanandaji, is determined by the relative payoffs between the abiding, evading and altering forms of behaviour. The vertical distinctions in Table 3 (from productive to unproductive/destructive) are separate from the horizontal ones (abide, evade or alter).
Henrekson 
Analytics: competition, rent-seeking and industrial policy in theory and application
The contemporary theoretical analysis of competition and industrial policy and the extent to which competition determined UK economic performance are important components in explaining the economic weaknesses that Northern Ireland exhibited prior to the arrival of DMCL. At the theoretical level, recent research indicates that industrial policy should be implemented in a way that promotes competition. 49 Along these theoretical lines, Aghion et al (2012) demonstrate that subsidies should not be concentrated on a particular firm in a particular industry. Instead, their formal analysis suggests that industrial policy is more likely to promote growth if subsidies are offered on an equal footing to more than one firm (p.9). 50 They conclude that the focus of industrial policy should be to be to design sectoral policies in order to promote a more competition-friendly and high-growth outcome.
In political economy terms, the less concentrated (and more competition-friendly) the allocation of state aid to a particular sector is, the less incentive there will be for any firm to lobby for that aid (p.18). The analysis of competition and industrial policy provided by Aghion et al indicates that competition-friendly industrial policy will minimise the resources devoted to lobbying. Thereby the waste associated with rent-seeking will be minimised if industrial policy promotes competition. The theoretical framework developed by Aghion et al complements the more applied approaches to the relationship between competition and economic outcomes. Crafts recent work on long-run UK economic performance acknowledges that failures in educational, fiscal and monetary policy as well as shortfalls in human and physical capital accumulation have all contributed to poor performance. 51 However, Crafts argues that competition deserves more prominence in the economic history literature. 52 He identifies the weakness of competition from the 1930s to the 1970s as undermining British productivity growth. 53 Moreover, Crafts demonstrates that since the late 1970s a greater policy emphasis on competition has promoted supply-side improvements that have ended relative economic decline. 54 There is an important political economy component within the approach taken by
Crafts: he recognised that securing higher productivity may be good economics, but 'it may be quite challenging' politically to get interest groups to see how the benefits of 'creative destruction' outweigh the losses to themselves. 55 This political economy focus is particularly pertinent to solving the puzzle of DMCL's failure. Crafts analysis of the role of competition in explaining relative UK economic decline (and renaissance) relates to his earlier findings on the sources of Northern Ireland's failure to keep pace during the Golden Age. 56 Crafts observed the existence of 'a rather worse version' of Britain's industrial relations and the disadvantages associated with 'soft' peripherality (such as access to information) hindered business in Northern Ireland. He contended that industrial policy failures compounded the situation. 57 Such observations are consistent with claiming that by the 1950s the Northern Irish economy faced a region-specific set of problems. Not only did magnified versions of British weaknesses exist, but also obstacles unique to the region also tended to reduce productivity growth.
Crafts identified that a 'political economy context' influenced the region's observed efficiency failures. 58 However, he did not explain why the incentives facing politicians and policy agencies were so perverse. Brownlow provided such an explanation by studying the archival sources and applying rent-seeking analysis. 59 He observed that (and unlike in in the rest of the UK. Unemployment was for example a much greater problem than elsewhere in the UK. Long-term unemployment was particularly acute. 61 Competition was weaker than in Britain during the Golden Age. The Safeguarding of Employment Act, 1947
for example prevented the free flow of workers from Britain. 62 Only when the UK joined the Common Market was the Act reversed. The politically powerful linen industry hindered restructuring by attempting to act as a monopsony in segments of the female labour market.
The detrimental consequences of weak competition are mentioned in the pioneering
Economic Survey of Northern Ireland (1957). 63 Isles and Cuthbert, the authors of the survey, argued that both management and workers required greater efficiency and that restrictive practices needed to be eliminated. 64 They suggested that weak competition -in the form of entry barriers -hindered the regional economy:
The limited size of the provincial market for many goods and the ease with which in some trades petty monopolies can be formed, at any rate in sheltered trades, may have helped to develop an attitude of mind which prefers safety though restriction to the chance of prosperity through enterprise and growth. 65 Isles and Cuthbert were particularly concerned that the 'attitude of restriction' would be particularly damaging in industries that served other sectors. 66 Monopoly and restrictive practices for example beset the coal trade. 67 A third group of economic problems were those unique to the region's circumstances. The negative economic effects of peripherality (particularly in its 'softer' form) could be placed in this category. It has been suggested that soft peripherality acts as an obstacle to prosperity, because Northern Ireland lagged economically it made it difficult for businesses to find the funds and/or access the information needed to keep pace with competition in Britain. This alleged inability to create up-to-date goods and services, associated with economic backwardness caused by isolation, in turn further hinders regional competitiveness. Soft peripherality is claimed to be associated with cumulative causation as initial disadvantage can bred long-term disadvantage. 68 Likewise, after 1969 the economic implications of civil unrest would further damage an already weak regional economy.
Narrative: the institutional and economic environment, 1971-1978
Having outlined the relevant analytical issues in terms of the distortions that emerged prior to the 1970s, we can now turn to interpreting the historical narrative. On the security side, violence by the middle of the 1970s was starting to decline from the peak levels of the early years of the Troubles. Figure 1 illustrates this trajectory.
[Insert Figure 1 here] Investment, particularly inward investment, was particularly weak after 1969, but the extent to which this weakness was due to violence rather than a legacy of the excessive reliance on a 'branch plant syndrome' is part of a wider counterfactual debate beyond the direct focus of this paper. 69 Applying the allocation of talent model mentioned earlier to the situation we could hypothesis that violence reduced the economy's growth potential and increased the social wastefulness associated with rent-seeking. As outlined in Table 4 , an important complication to addressing this bleak economic picture was the uneven distribution of unemployment between the two communities. This situation, with its security and political implications, made British governments after the introduction of direct rule in 1972 particularly eager to create jobs in areas with large concentrations of Catholic unemployed.
An estimated unemployment rate of 80 per cent in the housing estates neighbouring Dunmurry existed.
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[insert Table 4 lifted'. 73 However, the analysis within the Quigley report was more interventionist than in Cairncross. For example, the authors concluded that it was 'inevitable that the State should itself assume the role of entrepreneur'. 74 The report claimed that the public sector would pick winners as it could take greater risks than the private sector and it could ensure that jobs were located in locations that private enterprise would not choose. Such interventionist arguments provided a manifesto for officials supporting DMCL. However, the shift towards intervention also had an adverse selection implication, as it left officials vulnerable to opportunistic entrepreneurs (such as De Lorean) who discovered that securing generous subsidy packages was an easier task in Northern Ireland than elsewhere.
Narrative: Enter De Lorean
Journalists have attributed the failure of DMCL to John De Lorean's switch between Jekyll and Hyde behaviour variously to 'delusion', a 'narcissistic personality' driven by an 'exaggerated sense of entitlement' combined with 'a sense of reality...distorted beyond reason'. 75 De Lorean became 'a prisoner of his own vision' in the words of one of these accounts. 76 Such psychological speculations, while making for entertaining journalism, do not offer a particularly insightful way of solving the puzzle of the firm's failure. The narrative material in the remainder of this paper demonstrates that the political economy insights presented earlier in the paper provide a more convincing explanation. Rico or the Republic of Ireland because the oversight in Northern Ireland was weaker and crucially the subsidy package was more generous: it was easier to secure rents, and the rents on offer were greater than the alternatives.
A 1977 confidential report conducted by the First National Bank of Chicago presents probably the most prophetic, and certainly the most damming, investment analysis of DMC.
The report was conducted on behalf of Ojjeh Akram, a potential Saudi investor in the project when it was still to be located in Puerto Rico. 83 First National suggested that, in a world of high oil prices, the market for cars had changed. Consequently, an 'ethical' sports car of the type De Lorean was going to produce would not have adequate demand. 84 Hobbled by weak demand prospects and potentially strong cost and competitive pressures, the report concluded that shareholders equity would show a deficit of $20-25m. 85 million; in the span of a month and a half, the coffers had swelled twenty-fold. 94 While De
Lorean would tell the media the financial incentives for locating in Northern Ireland were attractive, he would also suggest they were not compelling. Yet they were approximately three times as much as the IDA offer and twice those in Puerto Rico. 95 That was more than enough compulsion (or additional rent) for De Lorean. (an offer amended in April 1979). 97 The formal offer bound the NIDA to consider making further loans to the firm in the case of events beyond the control of the firm (the formal documentation explicitly mentions factors such as exchange rates and interest rates).
The McKinsey commentary on the corporate plan placed the chances of DMCL managing to succeed, on the terms De Lorean had projected, at around 40 per cent. 98 McKinsey suggested that the scale of the public investment was a large risk. Demand for the vehicle was uncertain and the supply-side risks were associated with high sunk costs. They observed that should the business fail then neither the £24 million machinery budget nor the factory space itself had much in the way of commercially viable alternative uses. Anticipating the Treasury's misgivings about the project, the initial employment grant of £10m implied a fully employed cost per worker of £6500, which was extremely expensive. 99 The commentary angered De Lorean sufficiently that his legal representative sent an aggressively worded telex in response. The McKinsey assessment was described as 'a monument to the nonentrepreneur, who takes no risks and, therefore, never makes a mistake'. 100 The vehicle finally made its public debut at the Ulster motor show in February 1981, and began its full-scale production the same month, but privately the British government had already lost faith in DMCL. The Treasury for its part argued the whole saga was connected to failures of forecasting and control at the Northern Ireland Office (NIO) as well as the limits of DMCL. 111 As early as June 1980 the British government considered letting the firm collapse. The legal opinion at this stage was that the original contract left the government vulnerable if it refused to assist. 112 However, it was political rather than legal or commercial considerations that kept the money flowing into DMCL. 113 The engineering and financial aspects of the relationship with Lotus and GPD, a
Swiss-Based company, are of particular importance in explaining the failure. On the financial side, the pace at which government money flowed to Lotus was in greater quantities than anyone expected. Research and development work undertaken for DMCL was supposed to be paid to Lotus via GPD. A total of US $17.65 million (some £8.83 million) found its way to GPD following this route. DMCL paid GPD/Lotus a second pot of money, worth $23 million (£11.5 million) for additional development work. It was discovered subsequently that none of this first pot of money had been received by Lotus. 114 In terms of the engineering part of the business, many of the subsequent design and quality control problems arose because of disagreements between engineers at Lotus and DMCL. 115 Predictably, these disagreements caused quality control problems that in turn raised costs in order to make the car of saleable quality. These additional costs, compounded by the excessive executive pay and general extravagance of the business, contributed to making the firm extremely uncompetitive.
116 Table 5 illustrates the failure of the firm to create the promised jobs for much of its life. 117 Ironically, by the time the firm was employing approximately the promised level of workers it was clear that the pessimistic forecasts of investment analysts were accurate: too many cars were coming out of the factory gates awaiting too few buyers.
[Insert Table 5 here]
By December 1981, it was clear that while weekly production targets of 400 were being met there was insufficient demand. 118 Fallon and Srodes aptly describe De Lorean's negotiating tactics with the NIDA and British government as a combination of 'pleading, threatening or blackmail', and they observe that as time wore on it became a steadily less effective combination. 119 However, Fallon and Srodes do not provide an explanation for this diminishing effectiveness: one clue is that De Lorean was well aware that the more workers hired at DMCL, the harder it was politically to close the venture. On the other hand, he must have equally been aware that a larger workforce with greater production implied even higher levels of unsold cars and higher costs.
De Lorean became ever more desperate as sales stagnated, the firm's cash flow worsened and it seemed likely the car would never reach the market. Behind the scenes in Stormont and in London, he used legalistic bargaining lobbying in an attempt at extracting further concessions. Simultaneously he used his high media profile for the same ends. In his media utterances, he increasingly blamed civil unrest for his commercial problems. Civil servants drafted press releases and rebuttals to these public utterances. 120 In private negotiations with the British government, De Lorean argued that as the physical assets were government-owned, until the car reached the market, the firm had no security for a loan and hence £13.7 million was required if the factory gates were not to be closed. 121 Both parties were well aware that the sum would not be enough to get the car to the market, but the government were more pessimistic.
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In negotiation, the Secretary of State explained that if the Conservative government had been presented with the same proposition as their predecessors they may well have said no, but after due consideration they agreed under certain conditions. Namely, the loan was to ensure that the car could come to the market in December 1980 or January 1981, but that additional sums needed to be raised elsewhere. 123 The loan was a mixed blessing for De
Lorean. The loan helped alleviate the immediate cash flow problem; it made the firm liable for interest rate payments. A McKinsey monthly progress report by October 1980 predicted that market launch had slide further back to March 1981, but even that assessment could be overoptimistic. 124 Furthermore, the dealership system was not holding together. 
Narrative: some industrial policy lessons
As noted earlier in the paper, solving the specific puzzle of the failure of DMCL relates closely to explaining the more general puzzle: namely, the overall failure of Northern Irish industrial policy. Since the 1970s and 1980s, the relative dangers of market and government failure have influenced academic discussion on the merits of industrial policy. 132 Public Choice would suggest that rent-seeking behaviour, as well as more general government failure considerations, could prevent successful industrial policy. From a comparative institutional perspective, we observe that industrial policy varies internationally in terms of its relative success. In particular, in the real world such policies always emerge within a world of second-best institutions. Policymakers, rather than implementing a fixed menu of first-best/ best-practice policies need to take account of how proposed solutions affect multiple distortions. 133 Binding constraints can be removed in a variety of ways, some of which may be more politically feasible than others. Furthermore, binding constraints can evolve over time. The best-practice approach ignores context and downplays the institutions complications of real world policymaking. In contrast, the second-best institutional approach provides a more appropriate institutional context to the design and implementation of industrial policy. 134 Recent work on the political economy of industrial policy, which covers both developing and developed economies, indicates that the political equilibrium of a society (and/or institutional stickiness) determines the effectiveness of particular policy choices. 135 Hence, given political equilibriums, policymakers can try to either alter the equilibrium or work within the institutional environment generated. 136 As Robinson has observed, while there are government failure problems inherent in designing and operating industrial policy, successful policy must be more likely when there is a clear focus on efficiency outcomes. 137 This recent line of argument explains why more successful policy models did not emerge during the Troubles, but did elsewhere.
The South Korean experience provides an example of a more successful alternative, if also imperfect, model for industrial policy. In this case, while scholars disagree about aspects of the industrial policy regime; there is consensus that it was a successful and well-targeted set of policies. It has been argued by advocates of the "developmental state" thesis that intervention (via subsidies, trade restrictions, administrative guidance, public enterprises or credit allocation) explains the success of its industrial policy. 138 Other assessments of the strengths and weaknesses of South Korean industrial policy take a more sceptical view of the "developmental state" thesis. 139 However, these alternative approaches suggest that factors such as favourable human capital endowment and a relatively equal income and wealth distribution as well as other policies related to export-led industrialisation help explain the success. For example, the absence of large-scale inequalities in South Korea ensured that the political pressure for redistribution, which could easily descend into rent-seeking, was diminished. Moreover, a dedicated bureaucracy further acted to restrain rent-seeking. 
Conclusions
In terms of specific lessons from the rise and fall of DMCL, this paper has demonstrated that institutional structures and the ability to engage in rent-seeking take us further in providing an answer to the puzzle of DMCL's failure than do narratives that rest solely on the personality flaws of its founder. Large resources go to "official", rentseeking sectors, such as the government, army, or religion. Poorly defined property rights make wealth accessible to "unofficial" rent seekers. Large Wealth that is up for grabs, especially relative to smaller goods markets.
Large markets for goods. Good communications and transportation that facilitates trade.
Firm Size
Substantial authority and discretion of rent seekers (such as government officials, army etc) enable them to collect large sums unhindered by law or custom.
Easy entry and expansion, few diminishing returns in operations, access to capital markets.
Contracts
Ability to keep a large portion of collected rents. In firms, observability of output that yields appropriate rewards.
Clear property rights, patent protection. No expropriation of rents by rent seekers. Ability to start firms to collect quasi rents on talent.
Sources: Murphy, Schleifer and Vishny, "The Allocation of Talent", 519. 34 Drelichman builds on Rodrik's second-best approach to institutions, which states that apparently inefficient institutions might actually improve economic efficiency if other distortions are present, to consider the Spanish Mesta. Drelichman argues theoretically and produces convincing empirical evidence that the Mesta represented a second-best institutional arrangement. Koyama revisits the medieval prohibition on usury. The paper suggests that prohibition was a by-product of regulatory capture. Koyama develops a formal model and historical discussion that links higher interest rates to groups -including rulers, merchant-bankers and the Church -that could capture rents. Moreover, Koyama suggests that usury prohibition was a self-enforcing institution. Rubin considers bills of exchange and the existence of different equlibria concerned with impersonal exchange emerging under different conditions. In one case, which pervaded the Middle East, lending remained based around social-personal networks. In the other 'Western European' equilibrium, such personal financial networks were replaced by impersonal markets. Rubin speculates that Middle Eastern relative underdevelopment was in part the consequence of the continued reliance on personal-familial relations in the market for long-distance finance. See Drelichman, "Licence to Till"; Koyama, "Evading the 'Taint of Usury" and Rubin, "Bills of Exchange". For general points along these lines see Rodrik, "Second Best Institutions."
